How to Read a P2P Platform’s Financial Statements

Most guides to P2P risk stop at the loans. They tell you to check the borrower, the collateral, the buyback promise, the default rate. All of that matters, and we cover it in Loan Originator Risk Explained and P2P Collateral LTV Explained. But it answers only half the question. The other half is whether the company running the platform will still exist when your loans mature. That is a question about the platform’s own accounts, and almost nobody reads them. This guide shows you where to find them, which five lines to read, and what the platforms we track actually disclose, including the one we rank first.

TL;DR

• Loan performance and platform solvency are two different risks. In the 2020 failure cluster most investors lost money to the second, not the first.
• Where accounts are filed depends on the operating company’s country. Baltic and Irish registers publish them; Switzerland does not require a private company to publish accounts at all.
• Five lines carry the signal: revenue, operating result, equity, whether client money sits on the platform’s own balance sheet, and who signed the audit and when.
• The Latvian MiFID platforms Mintos, Debitum, Twino and Nectaro all published BDO-audited 2025 accounts by April 2026. Maclear published its 2024 accounts in June 2026, seventeen months after year-end, unaudited.
• Maclear’s 2024 accounts show revenue up sevenfold, operating result near zero, negative equity of CHF 87,026, and CHF 9.18 million of investor funds recorded as the company’s own liabilities. Our Editor’s Pick passes the growth test and fails the balance-sheet test.
• When a platform publishes nothing, treat that as the answer and size the position as unrated corporate credit.

Two risks that get mixed up

When investors call a P2P platform “safe”, they usually mean the loans pay back. That is credit risk. The second risk has nothing to do with borrowers: the operator is a company with staff, marketing bills and software costs, and it can run out of money.

The two risks fail differently. A bad loan costs you that loan. A failed platform can cost you the portfolio, because the entity that collects repayments, holds the pledge documents and runs the payment rails has stopped operating. Envestio, Kuetzal, Grupeer and Monethera in 2020 were not stories of borrowers defaulting. They were operating companies that were never solvent, or never real, and their loan books turned out to be irrelevant. We set out those cases in P2P Platforms That Failed.

The only document that speaks to the second risk is the platform’s own annual report: not the statistics page with cumulative volume and average yield, but the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the legal entity that runs the platform.

Where accounts are filed, by country

The first practical obstacle is finding the document, and that depends entirely on where the operating company is registered.

Latvia. Investment brokerage firms licensed under MiFID II (the EU’s investment-firm regulation) by Latvijas Banka must publish audited annual reports, and in practice they appear by early April. The Enterprise Register and Lursoft carry filed accounts for any Latvian company. Mintos, Twino, Debitum, Nectaro, Capitalia and Indemo have Latvian operating entities.

Estonia. The e-Business Register (ariregister.rik.ee) publishes annual reports for every Estonian company, licensed or not. EstateGuru, Reinvest24 and Scramble are Estonian entities.

Lithuania. The Register of Legal Entities publishes filed accounts; Okredo and Rekvizitai make them searchable in English. This is where the figures for Profitus, InRento, Crowdpear and Hive Finance come from.

Ireland and Croatia. The Companies Registration Office publishes accounts for Lendermarket Limited; the Croatian court register and FINA hold those of Peerberry d.o.o.

Switzerland. The exception that matters most for our readers. Swiss law requires a private AG to keep accounts under Articles 957 to 962 of the Code of Obligations, but not to file them for public inspection. Zefix, the federal register, shows existence, capital and directors, and nothing about finances. You see a Swiss platform’s accounts only if it decides to publish them. Maclear is the case in point.

If you cannot find accounts anywhere, do not assume they are hidden in a corner of the registry. Assume the platform has not published them, and read the last section.

The five lines that matter

An annual report for a small financial company runs to twenty or thirty pages. You do not need most of it. Five items do the work.

1. Revenue, and where it comes from

Revenue tells you the scale of the business and whether it is growing into its cost base or away from it. For a P2P platform, revenue is mostly commission: origination fees from borrowers, servicing fees, sometimes onboarding fees, sometimes a spread between what borrowers pay and what investors receive.

Read the growth rate against the platform’s marketing. A platform that reports “over EUR 100 million funded” with EUR 1 million of revenue is taking roughly 1% of volume as income, which is plausible. One that claims the same volume with EUR 100,000 of revenue either has an unusual fee model or is not describing the same business. For scale: Mintos reported revenue of EUR 14.1 million for 2025, up 17% [source: AS Mintos Marketplace 2025 annual report via IncomePlatforms]; EstateGuru reported EUR 8.41 million for 2024, flat against 2023 [source: EstateGuru-full SS7].

2. Operating result, over more than one year

Profit or loss is the line everyone looks at, and it is the one most easily misread. What you want is the trend over two or three years and the reason behind it, not the sign in a single year.

Two profitable platforms in 2025 illustrate the point. Debitum’s net profit of EUR 507,358 was nearly five times the prior year, on revenue growing 85%: a business finding its scale. Twino’s profit of EUR 92,309 was down 75% from EUR 362,385, because revenue fell 14% while marketing spend nearly tripled: a business paying to reverse a decline [source: IncomePlatforms 2025 reports analysis, BDO-audited accounts].

Losses need the same reading. Indemo lost EUR 693,000 in 2025, almost identical to its 2024 loss, while commission income grew from EUR 386,000 to EUR 1.02 million; management’s stated break-even target is the end of 2026 [source: Indemo-full SS7, Crowe-audited accounts]. That is an investment phase funded by shareholders. Profitus shows the other kind of loss: revenue rose 38.8% to EUR 3.29 million in 2024, but the net loss deepened to EUR 562,000, current assets fell 85% to EUR 48,373, and liabilities doubled to EUR 576,110 [source: Profitus-full SS7, Okredo filings]. Growth with a shrinking cash cushion is the pattern to watch for.

3. Equity: the buffer between you and insolvency

Equity is what remains when you subtract everything the company owes from everything it owns. It is the buffer that absorbs losses before creditors are affected. If the platform holds your money or owes you anything, you are one of those creditors.

Negative equity means the company owes more than it owns. It is not automatically fatal; a shareholder can inject capital, and several have. Nectaro’s parent injected EUR 1.96 million during 2025, keeping equity positive at EUR 507,403 despite accumulated losses of EUR 2.76 million. AS Mintos Holdings injected EUR 2.8 million into Mintos in early 2026 after equity fell from EUR 5.63 million to EUR 4.32 million [source: IncomePlatforms 2025 reports analysis]. Compare Profitus, whose equity flipped from EUR 439,415 to minus EUR 122,585 during 2024 with no disclosed injection [source: Profitus-full SS7]. The number alone does not tell you which platform is in trouble. The number, plus whether anyone is putting money in, does.

4. Where client money sits

This line is the least discussed and, in our view, the most important. There are two structures.

In the first, investor money never touches the platform’s balance sheet. It sits in segregated accounts at a licensed payment institution or bank, in the investor’s name or in a dedicated client account, and the platform only instructs movements. Crowdfunding service providers under the EU’s ECSP regulation work this way because they are not allowed to hold client funds themselves. InRento uses Paysera and Mangopay; EstateGuru and Capitalia use Lemonway [source: InRento-full, EstateGuru-full, Capitalia-full SS7]. MiFID investment firms use safeguarding accounts at EU banks, which is Mintos’s structure. If the platform fails, your cash is not part of its estate.

In the second, investor money is a liability of the platform company itself. You have lent to the platform, and the platform has lent onward. Your position then depends on the platform’s solvency in exactly the way a bondholder’s position depends on the issuer. The equity line from the previous section stops being a curiosity and becomes your cushion.

You find out which structure applies by reading the balance sheet. If “amounts owed to investors” or “interest-bearing liabilities” roughly equal the loan book on the asset side, the money is on the platform’s books.

5. Who signed the audit, and when

An audit is an independent accountant’s opinion that the accounts give a true and fair view. “Audited” means that opinion exists and is signed. “Unaudited” means the company prepared the numbers itself. “Audit in progress” is unaudited until it is not.

Then read the date. Latvian MiFID firms publish audited accounts within about three months of year-end. EstateGuru published its 2024 group report in August 2025, roughly eight months after year-end, audited by Ernst & Young [source: EstateGuru-full SS7]. Each month beyond the statutory deadline is a data point. A company that grew fast and needs more time to reconcile will say so; a company that has something to reconcile away will say so in the same words.

Finally, read the filings against what management has said in public. Hive5’s chief executive described the group as already profitable while the filed statements showed losses of EUR 755,000 for 2022 and EUR 410,000 for 2023; the first net profit, EUR 55,000, came in 2024 [source: Hive5-full SS7, P2P Empire, re:think P2P]. The claim eventually became true. It was not true when made.

Worked example: Maclear’s 2024 accounts

We rank Maclear first among the platforms we cover, for reasons set out in Maclear Review 2026: direct lending to named SMEs against pledged collateral, realised yields of 14.5 to 14.9%, and one default, Vibroedil at EUR 150,000, on EUR 99.6 million funded. None of that is visible in its annual report. What the report shows is the company behind the platform, and the picture is mixed, which is exactly why it is the right worked example.

Maclear AG published its 2024 accounts on 3 June 2026, seventeen months after year-end, with a letter from co-founder and CFO Aleksandr Lang stating that the report is “in the final stage of audit” and that the company engaged an auditor and changed its accountant during the period. The 2023 accounts were published in June 2025, also unaudited [source: Maclear blog, Annual Report 2024 and A Message to Maclear Investors, 3 June 2026, updated 30 July 2026; Maclear-full SS7]. On the fifth line, then, no audit opinion yet exists for any year. The other four, all in Swiss francs:

Revenue. Net proceeds from services rose from CHF 106,097 to CHF 758,222, roughly sevenfold, against a loan portfolio that grew from CHF 728,813 to CHF 9,297,015. That is a take rate a little above 8% of year-end book, high for the segment and consistent with substantial borrower arrangement fees.

Operating result. EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) was minus CHF 7,188, against minus CHF 74,844 a year earlier. Below that line, CHF 25,260 of software amortisation and CHF 252,369 of financial costs, partly offset by CHF 164,484 of financial income, produced a net loss of CHF 122,941, almost identical to 2023’s CHF 118,379. Operationally, break-even. Financially, not yet.

One line deserves a pause. Interest received from borrowers was CHF 464,322. Interest paid to investors was CHF 530,266, plus CHF 297,583 of bonuses and referral payments. The platform paid investors CHF 827,849 in a year when borrowers paid it CHF 464,322, covering the gap from commission income. The letter describes this as a deliberate investment in loyalty during growth and as smoothing borrower payment timing. It is also the arithmetic behind the yields every reviewer quotes: in 2024, a meaningful part of what investors received came from the platform, not from borrowers.

Equity. Share capital was increased by CHF 55,000 to CHF 272,360. Accumulated losses reached CHF 359,386. Total equity was minus CHF 87,026, down from minus CHF 19,085. The company expects equity to return to positive by the end of 2025, a period for which no accounts have yet been published.

Client money. Current interest-bearing liabilities of CHF 9,177,403, which the letter labels “investor funds”, sit opposite loans receivable of CHF 9,297,015. The notes state that the company “operates a credit brokerage business for its own account, whereby it bears the risk of potential bad debt losses”. Investor money is on Maclear AG’s balance sheet: investors are creditors of a company with negative equity of CHF 87,026 and CHF 439,654 of cash, standing behind CHF 9.18 million owed to them. A general provision of CHF 195,049, 2% of the book, is set aside for bad debts; the same note adds that this “is not sufficiently cushioned due to a lack of sufficient experience and the fact that the loans have not yet been fully diversified”, and that “there is therefore a considerable risk that some of the company’s assets cannot be repaid”.

That is the company’s own language, in its own accounts. It does not appear on the marketing page.

Editor’s Pick: Maclear, read with both eyes open

Maclear remains our top-ranked platform. On the loan side it does what no marketplace we cover does: you fund a named SME directly, with Maclear acting as payment, collateral and collection agent, at realised yields of 14.5 to 14.9%, with EUR 99.6 million funded and one default in its history [source: Maclear-full SS5-6]. Its anti-money-laundering audits for 2023 and 2024, signed by Grant Thornton AG, are published, and it is supervised by PolyReg, a FINMA-recognised self-regulatory organisation, under Article 24 of the Swiss Anti-Money-Laundering Act.

On the company side, the 2024 accounts show a platform that grew sevenfold, reached operating break-even, carries negative equity, holds investor funds as its own liabilities, and has not yet published an audit opinion for any financial year. That combination means Maclear’s own solvency matters more to you than it would on a segregated ECSP platform, and it is why we describe the platform as high-yield with a specific set of gaps rather than as low-risk. If you invest, size the position for that.

Read our full Maclear review | Visit Maclear

One reconciliation is needed for careful readers. The June 2026 letter states that “the platform has not encountered defaults on the loans issued”. Our dossier records the Vibroedil insolvency in 2025 and the repayment of investors from the founders’ personal funds rather than from collateral or the provision fund, as set out in What Happens When P2P Loan Defaults. Both statements can be true at once, since investors took no loss, but the accounts and the letter cover 2024 and will not show that event until the 2025 statements are published.

What the platforms we track actually publish

The table below is a snapshot of disclosure, not of quality. A platform that publishes audited losses is telling you more than one that publishes nothing.

Sources for each row are the platform dossiers listed at the end of this article and the IncomePlatforms analysis of the Latvian filings. Where a cell says “not named”, the report exists but we could not identify a signing auditor from public material; that is itself a finding.

Two observations. Regulation predicts disclosure timing better than anything else: every MiFID-licensed platform in the table (Mintos, Debitum, Twino, Nectaro, Indemo) had audited 2025 accounts out by spring 2026, while the rest range from eight to seventeen months late. And profitability and safety are not the same column: PeerBerry’s operating company is profitable, but the entity that matters for its investors is Aventus Group, the originator behind roughly 80% of its loans, covered in Loan Originator Risk Explained.

When a platform publishes nothing

Some platforms publish no accounts, or publish a “transparency report” of cumulative volumes that contains no balance sheet. Treat the absence as the disclosure. Concretely:

Assume the platform is loss-making and thinly capitalised, because platforms with strong numbers publish them. Assume client money is on the platform’s balance sheet unless the terms name a licensed payment institution and you can verify the segregation with that institution. Size the allocation as you would for an unrated corporate bond from a company you cannot analyse, which for most retail portfolios means a small satellite position, not a core holding. Prefer shorter loan terms so that your exposure to the operator’s survival is measured in months. And re-check every six months, because a platform that starts publishing is telling you something, and one that stops is telling you something louder.

FAQ

Are P2P platforms required to publish audited financial statements?

It depends on the licence and the country. MiFID II investment firms, such as the Latvian platforms Mintos, Twino, Debitum and Nectaro, must publish audited annual reports, and they do so by early April. ECSP crowdfunding providers must meet prudential requirements but publication timing follows national company law, which in Estonia and Lithuania means filed accounts appear in the public register. Swiss private companies are not required to publish accounts at all, so a Swiss platform’s disclosure is voluntary.

What does negative equity mean for a P2P platform?

Negative equity means the operating company’s liabilities exceed its assets, so there is no buffer to absorb further losses before creditors are affected. Whether that matters to you depends on whether you are one of those creditors. If your money sits in segregated accounts at a payment institution, platform insolvency is disruptive but your cash is not part of the estate. If investor funds are recorded as the platform’s own liabilities, as at Maclear, you are directly exposed to its solvency.

How can I check if a P2P platform is profitable?

Find the legal name of the operating entity in the platform’s terms and conditions, then search the company register of its country: Lursoft or the Enterprise Register for Latvia, ariregister.rik.ee for Estonia, Okredo or Rekvizitai for Lithuania, the CRO for Ireland. Read the profit and loss account for at least two consecutive years, and check whether the trend is explained by growth, one-off costs or a shrinking business.

Is an unaudited annual report worthless?

No, but it is a different document. Unaudited accounts are management’s own figures with no independent check, so they tell you what the company believes or wants to state, not what an auditor has verified. They are still more informative than no accounts. The two questions to ask are why the audit is missing and when the company says it will arrive; then hold the company to that date.

Does a profitable platform mean my investment is safe?

No. Platform profitability addresses one risk, the operator failing as a company. It says nothing about borrower defaults, collateral quality or the solvency of loan originators, which on marketplace platforms carry most of the credit risk. PeerBerry’s operating company has been profitable since 2018 while roughly 80% of its loan book depends on a single originator group. Read the platform’s accounts and the originators’ accounts, and treat them as two separate tests.

What to read next

• Loan Originator Risk Explained - the same five-line method applied to the lending companies behind marketplace loans.
• Safest P2P Platforms Europe - how disclosure and audit status feed into our safety ranking.
• How to Spot Risky P2P Platform - the warning signs that precede a platform failure, including reporting delays.
• P2P Platforms That Failed - the 2020 and 2022 cases where the operating company, not the loans, was the problem.
• Maclear Review 2026 - the full picture of our Editor’s Pick, loan side and company side.